

Christianity and Crisis

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Toward a United Nations Council

IN a council of despair, believing that there will be no peace unless it is built upon the guiding principle of the equality of mankind, a commentator has recently outlined three distinct possibilities for post-war world organization which would negate the freedom and equality of peoples:

1. The seizure of power by an international military machine.
2. The seizure of power by an international business machine.
3. The seizure of power—in the name of world order—by an international fascist government.

These are dark words. A realistic look at the moods of the present Congress and the freely stated objectives of coalitions within that Congress does not permit one to set this prophecy aside as aimless pessimism.

Do the people of the churches want the kind of world outlined in any one of these dire prophecies?

Will the people of the churches wait, in supine inertness, the oncoming of any one of these worlds in which their children will live?

Or is there some yeasty substance in the life of the churches which can be given political expression *now*—not postponed until the war is over?

In the issue of *Christianity and Crisis* for January 25, we carried a summary of a program for action by a group of churchmen, under the chairmanship of Bishop McConnell. This is more than an action program. It is really a declaration of faith, of conviction that the members of the churches want the United States to play its full and sacrificial role in creating, step by step, a world order in which free men can live in justice, and in peaceful and rewarding interdependence.

The Christian Conference on War and Peace proposes to help develop concerted action by those in the churches who, recognizing the unity of the war and the peace, are convinced that the nucleus of an effective world government must be established in the very process of conducting the war.

The master enemy of those who would like to work at this objective is the confusion of issues. We shall

have to discriminate between measures which need to be taken for immediate purposes and legislative proposals which will be equivalent to a national policy forbidding our complete identification with the post-war struggle of other nations.

Take such a simple statement as that recently made by Ambassador Winant: "We owe to our returning soldiers jobs and the guarantee that they will not have to fight a war again." We hear this over the radio; we read it in our newspapers. We agree. But then what? How can we accomplish these ends?

There are many people who act and think as though there would be one moment in time when the Congress of the United States would consider and vote upon some complete scheme of world organization. Time enough then to consider whether the proposed scheme will bring order and justice in our own borders and a magical lightning rod against the threat of a third World War. The fact is that national policies, one by one, up for Congressional consideration in the spring of 1943, will go far to determine the kind of world in which our children will have to live. How can the intent of the people of the churches affect these decisions?

The Christian Conference on War and Peace assumes that the response of members of the churches can and must be expressed in political terms. National groupings within the Christian enterprise will continue to bring pressure upon members of Congress who are even now organizing in a variety of coalitions to disturb the full prosecution of the war, and put into national policies the self-seeking of powerful groups of interests. But the time has past for putting too much faith in this kind of influence. These issues can be met most effectively in communities related to each member of Congress. Telling a Congressman what you expect of him in his own bailiwick is of more weight than a deputation meeting him in his Washington office.

The first objective in the program of action proposed by the Christian Conference on War and Peace is to win the war. There is no circumlocution in this phrasing. It is a "struggle for freedom" for us and for all men everywhere, but this struggle involves winning a war. The war is an indivisible part of the

struggle for freedom. The war must be won if there is to be the slightest chance that we may be able to build the kind of world order which we know so well in its upper phrasing, and so little in terms of "next step" strategy.

The second objective is to secure an organized Council of the United Nations now—to prosecute the war and to plan the peace. If there were full organization for prosecuting the war, such an instrument would be used in establishing the peace. What other agency would be at once available in the chaos of post-war days?

The establishment of such a Council has political implications. Is the reluctance to establish a real organization of the Council of the United Nations due, in part, at least, to uncertainty as to whether people whose votes count are unwilling to accept the political implications of such an organized group?

The third and fourth sections of the program of the Christian Conference on War and Peace furnish a condensed outline of points around which the Conference will progressively develop its strategy as the issues emerge. There will be no one arena in which citizens can vote for "economic cooperation by the United Nations to raise standards of living throughout the world." In successive acts of national legislation *now*, we shall be adopting policies for our own life which will condition, and even determine, our post-war contribution to world economy.

Nor is there one hour in which the people of the United States will "extend democracy at home—eliminate racial discrimination—enlarge economic opportunity." That battle front is on the streets of the community in which we live. If Christian groups are powerless in giving concrete evidence that their pronouncements on racial relationships are programs of action, not merely manifestos, it might be better to abjure these statements. The times are late.

This program is a plan of strategy. The word "strategy" implies the reducing of vague generalizations to specific national policies; the selection of a few central issues and concentration upon them; the selection of these issues in terms of the events of the next few months.

The time for concerted action is now. The very outcome of the war is affected by the reluctance of the United States to indicate now the direction in which it will move after the war is over. There are decisive hours ahead in the spring of 1943, when the people of Europe and Asia will know by the acts of our Congress the road that this nation intends to take. Will this knowledge make for hope or for despair?

R. McC.

The Politics of North Africa

LIBERAL opinion is still divided and confused about the political strategy which underlies and surrounds our North African military adventure. The resignation of Paul Appleby from the State Department, after the appointment of the notorious Peyrouton as Governor of Algeria, proves that Secretary Hull is wrong in ascribing the apprehensions of the public to ignorance of the real facts. Appleby is a man of high character and intelligence, and presumably knew all the facts. He resigned in protest against the policy of collaboration with fascism, followed by the State Department.

It may be that the error of the State Department is one of momentary expediency. On the other hand it may be a part of a general policy. Even momentary expediency in the African situation has proved a costly mistake; for it has undoubtedly spread confusion and dismay among the genuinely democratic forces of France. But there is some evidence that elements in the State Department are thinking not merely in terms of immediate expediency but have come to a more far-reaching conclusion. That conclusion seems to be that there is no possibility of establishing a genuinely democratic regime in either France or the continent generally; and that therefore it is important to strengthen the hands of "moderate" fascism against the peril of bolshevism.

If this is not the general policy which underlies the immediate tactics of the State Department, there is at least no clear indication that it is not. Brave speeches are made. But the actions belie the speeches, and are such as to sow confusion in the ranks of all true democrats. President Roosevelt has countered the criticism of our North African policy with a curious air of flippancy. Democracy itself is imperiled if genuine and loyal criticism fails to win a candid response. It would be tragic indeed if the necessary secrecy which must be maintained in regard to immediate tactics in war-time should become the cover for a far-reaching international policy which stands in essential contradiction to the real and professed aims of the democratic world. The general public does not know all the facts. But the facts which are known justify apprehension. Even if the apprehensions should prove groundless, it is obvious that our State Department has no clear and constructive ideas for the reconstruction of Europe. That is an ominous situation. It will either contribute to the bolshevisation of Europe, if the desperate people of the continent decide that it is preferable to fascism. Or it will actually help to establish fascism in Europe.

R. N.

Why the League Failed

GEORGE STEWART

MANY liberals of the Western world, Christians, Jews, and other men of good will, looked upon the League with an almost Messianic hope. We in America revered it as a memorial to Woodrow Wilson, spokesman for American ideas. We saw in it a step toward a desperately needed organization of mankind to make and to keep the peace. Some of us refused to doubt its efficacy even when we saw it by-passed in one major crisis after another. We shut our eyes and held our faith in it, in the face of discouragement. The League seemed the cornerstone in the political expression of our faith. It was surrounded with an almost religious aura. We could not forsake it. We could hardly bear to hear it criticized.

Now, friends of the League, friends of peace, must diagnose its demise with the cool-headed judgment of a scientific post-mortem. For the life and death of the League affects all mankind.

We are faced with facts so grim that we dare not deceive ourselves. We must see reality "bare and to the buff." If we are worthy of victory again, it is imperative to see why the League failed, and to take a few resolute steps in world political organization which will hold together the diverse fabric of international life, until, through a mutual trust engendered by working together, we can elaborate and perfect that structure. It would be disastrous to attempt either too little, or too much.

No such assemblage of statesmen had ever before occurred as that at Paris. Most of us believed that the Congress of Vienna, the only comparable gathering, had been a cynical meeting of professional diplomats playing a game of international chess with peoples and states as pawns. We were promised an immense gesture of honest statesmanship. But ironically, Talleyrand, Metternich, and their colleagues, using the yardstick of legitimacy, were able to give mankind a century of comparative peace, a century which contrasts sharply with the explosive events of the last three decades.

Why did the League fail when so many intelligent men and women of good will placed their faith in it?

First, the plan was too American. It was foreign to the thought and experience of most of the world. It came out of our American history, channelled through the brain of Woodrow Wilson. True, men of other nations contributed to its basic ideas, notably some British thinkers. The Covenant is as typically Anglo-Saxon as our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution or the Statute of Westminster.

Second, it was accepted by the allied and associated powers for two reasons, both of which augured ill for the future.

One of these reasons was that Wilson's high idealism and the prestige of America almost compelled the victors to accept it. Wilson, representing America, had almost too much power and esteem. He was hailed as a savior by the populace of European cities. For a few months he stood as no man had ever stood, as the embodiment of the hopes of mankind. Any promise we held out for the saving of the world stood a good chance of acceptance. Public opinion in a stricken Europe was in an apocalyptic mood, looking for an almost divine deliverer. Woodrow Wilson seemed to meet that need for a fleeting half year. No statesman could have successfully opposed Wilson on the League issue. The weak League which came of his efforts led to an equally great disillusionment and gave aid and comfort to the most sinister political circles and to the forces of reaction.

The other reason for acceptance of the League related to the seamy side of the peace conference. Wilson would have none of the Treaty unless the Covenant were included. Clemenceau and Lloyd George took the Covenant in order to secure the rest of the Treaty. The League was never wholeheartedly accepted by France or by the rest of the Continent. Smaller states gladly came in, as it gave them for the first time a place in the sun along side the big powers. Germany, which was expected to hail the Covenant as an antidote to this severe section of the Treaty, naturally doubted its efficacy, as she was expressly excluded from membership at the beginning.

Third, too much was asked and expected of the League. It was too weak to bear the load placed upon it. This was not the fault of the League. The idea of a victory to make the world safe for democracy, and a war to end war, attached to the League itself. All over the earth it was promoted as a means of preventing war. But given Europe as it was, given the League as it was created—the prevention of war was impossible. Its members and the United States at the moment of their greatest power after an overwhelming victory *refused to pledge themselves in advance of the crisis* for collective security. There was a vague hope that when the crisis came, some moral compulsion or enlightened self-interest would suddenly bring them together. Cecil and Wilson supported the Covenant on the postulate that moral forces would prevail in any crisis. They manifested an almost naïve belief that public opinion would be precise and determined on the side of the common weal. They gave scant attention to French demands for an International Police Force and a General Staff. But no clear, aroused, morally informed public

opinion arose anywhere in the last two decades, save at fleeting moments, never in time to prevent Hitler rearming to raid the world.

Political and Moral Foundation Undermined

Fourth, much of the political and moral foundation was cut from under the League. Democracy began to disintegrate beneath the whole democratic structure of the new organization. Democracy as we had known it in Europe was already sadly in disrepair. Forces which were released in the post-war era were furthering this process. Liberal democracy was in disrepute. Fascism was beginning to raise its head; militant, materialistic communism was astride the Muscovite lands and was conducting underground campaigns to further the world or continuing revolution. Germany, Russia, Italy and many of the Balkans had never known democracy. They were new to its ways. In Germany and in other lands, Moderates, unaided by strong and resolute support from the great democracies of the West, were impotent to handle various internal enemies, and their prestige and power rapidly declined.

A democratic League composed largely of undemocratic members could not be expected to keep the world safe for democracy or to prevent war.

Fifth, Article XIX was never resolutely put into force. This article read:

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

True, a number of provisions regarding reparations and indemnities, military establishments and other matters were altered, but not in so rapid and forthright a manner as to aid the Moderates in Germany who were running a losing race with the die-hard reactionaries.

Sixth, the principle of self-determination of peoples, as fair as it seems on paper, was highly destructive when unharnessed to the equally valid principle of federation among the smaller states of *Mittel-Europa*, the Danube Basin, and the Balkans. We fought the Civil War to preserve the Union and against states rights carried to the extreme of secession. Self-determination did bring the fulfillment of political aspiration for independence to several peoples for a few brief years, but the result, freed as these new states were from mutual obligations for collective security with neighboring weak states, was an inflamed nationalism. Unsupported by one another in some pledged, prearranged, resolute bond of mutual aid, these states which had lately realized their hope of independence, were overrun one after another. Grave crises were bound to arise under

rampant nationalism which the new world organization was unprepared to handle.

Seventh, the proponents of the League held too low an opinion of European institutions as they existed before 1914. Some of the major constructive elements in the political and legal set up of European states should have been incorporated in the Covenant rather than making it so exclusively an Anglo-American statement in its final form. The Covenant was inserted in the various conventions ancillary to Versailles, the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly. This was a psychological mistake. Wilson thought it would give moral vindication to the rest of the Treaty, much of which he did not like. Article XIX, providing for revision of treaties, often comforted statesmen in these hurried early months of 1919 in Paris—men who were laboring under pressure from the press of the world to get the job done. They hoped vainly that a good Covenant made with their left hands would wash clean all they were doing with their right hands.

Too small attention was given to differences in culture and education, to the desire, or the lack of desire for democracy, and to the political maturity or immaturity of the different peoples involved. Although the fall of the Dual Monarchy was highly probable in a few years, it had not a few qualities which were commendable. An ethnographic map of that terrain looks like a Persian carpet. It is not easy to govern such a mixture. Nor did the break up of Austria-Hungary solve the problems in that area.

Lack of Clear-cut Political Principles

Eighth, there was a lack of clear-cut political principles resolutely pursued by its most powerful members and by the United States. The Western democratic world, as strong and as energetic as it is, employing the philosophy of the eighteenth century and the economic ideal which sprang up after the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth, drifted in a moral vacuum or slept in false security, while militant creeds of new secular faiths, fanatically preached and ruthlessly prosecuted, rose to power. The empty house, only half swept and indifferently garnished, was broken into by seven other spirits worse than the first. Economic and social injustice existed not only in lands with measurable political equality, but in even sharper tension elsewhere.

A basic need existed as it does today for an enlargement of economic frontiers and the preservation of the smaller cultural, ethnic and spiritual entities. Lacking the ideals and the stern tenacity to achieve this by negotiation, or even to relieve severe situations by the ordered use of force under decent international auspices, we were forced to watch Hitler enlarge the economic frontiers of Germany and rip

to shreds the smaller cultural, ethnic and spiritual entities involved.

Ninth, there was no military power either to arrest aggressors or to enforce its decrees.

One need not give up one's confession to being a liberal, a democrat, a Christian or a devout Jew, to see that men of ill will must be stopped forcibly from oppressing the weak or robbing and enslaving their neighbors. No one should be allowed to brutalize fellow men and women, even if it be in his own house. It is our concern if a man beats the life out of a child in Java, or a gang of Storm Troopers drive great scientists from Heidelberg, or a mob of Americans hang a Negro in a lynching bee. There are brutes, retrogressives, spiritual throwbacks in every nation and in almost every family. These people must be kept in control by the only restraint they recognize, overwhelming force. Gentleness is a provocation to their aggressive instincts; the willingness to reason, discuss and to compromise they take to be a sign of weakness. The most dynamic political leaders of the last decade have been plain criminals. Whatever shape our new international set-up to make and to keep the peace shall take, it must have adequate military strength to enforce its decisions.

Tenth, the League failed because millions in the Anglo-Saxon world mixed their categories. We surrounded the whole discussion with an emotional atmosphere which did discredit to both our religious and our political acumen. We fell again for the old heresy of identifying socio-political hopes and devices with the Kingdom of God. We equated religion and democracy, and felt with understandable but mistaken ardor that the League was the best expression of both. In a limited sense it was. But we pictured it as more powerful and adequate than it could possibly be under the existing Covenant. A more historically critical view would have told us that it was a feeble instrument. It would have been far better to have pictured the League to the peoples of the world as weak, tentative and experimental, but a device from which might grow a better organization in the future.

Within the powers given them, the servants of the League accomplished a magnificent record. The failure of the League to prevent major crises was due to its own inherent structural weaknesses and to the hesitating and downright deceitful action of its own members. To say that it failed due to events beyond its control is to beg the whole question. Any organization given to the common people of the world as a device to relieve injustice and to keep the peace must be powerful enough to meet and to resolve major crises. We expected the resilience and strength of an oak. We planted a tree of lesser valor.

Eleventh, the League never met its highest possibilities because England and France were either un-

willing or unable to give unified backing at critical junctures. Manchuria, Ethiopia and Spain are three examples. Dr. T. V. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs for China, in an address at Carnegie Hall on October 10, 1942, remarked in part:

"But we know that the League failed for a very concrete reason—because the two great powers which controlled it and could prevent action by it did not believe it was necessary for their own security.

"That is not the situation today.

"Today those powers which did not feel the League useful to safeguard their own security, and you who felt it even less necessary for your own security, have to recognize that international order and collective security have become essential for the survival of strong states as well as the preservation of weaker ones. Today an aggressor left alone in his preparations can get a death jump on a strong state as well as a weak one.

"A second difference from the League—is that this time we can form our international society while we are still fighting the war.

"Undoubtedly much of the trouble with the League was that it was formed *after* and not *during* the first World War when Allied Nations no longer had to find answers to the thousand and one reasons why men do not want to cooperate. . . ."

Twelfth, the League failed because the Covenant did not provide for instantaneous and automatic application of full sanctions toward aggressors.

The first two paragraphs of Article XVI read:

"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

The first part of this is explicit, but the Council's duty only to recommend to the Governments effective military, naval and air contributions to protect the members of the League was the fatal weakness. Also oil was not included in exports which were to be shut off. Military action was left to the discretion, good will or ill will of the individual members. Thus the latter part of Article XVI effectively wiped out the earlier definite language. The only sanctions which will work are those which all members are bound to obey *automatically and instantane-*

ously, and which include the provision that if any country fails to come into the enterprise of mutual aid at once that such a betrayal will be equal to aggression.

Chief Reason for Failing

Thirteenth, the chief reason the League failed was because the United States refused to participate as a member. It is hard for Americans to realize the shock which our refusal to join gave to such peoples as the Czechs who hailed Woodrow Wilson almost as a superhuman personality, to the British, to all the Continent and nations in every part of the world. At its birth, the League was fatally handicapped through American repudiation, repudiation by the people out of whose life and thought it grew, the most powerful single unit in the world and in spite of all blemishes, the most liberal. Millions overseas could not understand our sharp reversal of opinion from the enthusiasm for world service of 1917 and 1918 to the reaction of 1919 and 1920, and they cannot understand it now. The truth is there was no great reversal of public opinion while the League issue was being debated during the peace negotiations and for months thereafter. Harding decided to interpret the vote of 1920 as anti-League. As a matter of fact a majority of the Senate voted for the League, but a two-thirds vote was required. By that time the campaign of Hiram Johnson, Henry Cabot Lodge and William E. Borah against Wilson and all his works had won away enough votes to make a two-thirds majority impossible.

The *single greatest fear* of non-American statesmen regarding a structure for world peace after this war is *that history will repeat itself*.

America's refusal to come in effectively stopped any genuine application of sanctions, thereby losing to the League its major means of controlling aggressors. Sanctions were bound to fail. If they were applied rigidly and the United States were not included, we would have insisted on trading with the offending nation. There was always the danger of sinking our ships and bringing us into the war. No nation, especially England and France, wanted to take this risk. Our refusal to join, thus fundamentally weakened the League at one of the few points where it could exercise effective pressure on predatory nations.

Our rejection gave the League a bad start, created cynicism and doubt, and held us aloof from the greatest experiment, so far, in attempting an organization to make and to preserve peace. *We impoverished ourselves politically and spiritually for selfish reasons, and we impoverished and endangered others by refusing to take our share of whatever praise or blame, whatever disgrace or glory, might attach to the League.*

In the face of world needs for two decades we have been spiritually and politically stopped. When our representatives from all walks of life have raised their voices, and they have done so magnificently at times, our critics abroad have spoken of fulsome American preaching, or have thought with sorrow on what might have been. We had the small foreign policy of a state the size of Costa Rica instead of one suitable to the largest nation in the world.

But no person emotionally and politically mature need be cynical about the League. It accomplished much. The seed of a supra-national order has been sown and it will never die. As Irving Fisher has pointed out, the League period in international life is comparable to what John Fiske called the "critical period" in American history, when our thirteen colonies were loosely federated under our Articles of Confederation. It was a painful period of poorly coordinated effort and state rivalries. It was launched with a promise it could not fulfill. Fortunately for us during these years no major divisive controversy became a burning issue, as slavery later became. And, most fortunately, we were blessed at the moment by statesmen who saw the value of New Hampshire, Vermont and other small and poor states as well as the worth and power of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania. We were blessed with statesmanship which could make the grand compromise, which is politics at their best, and achieve results which benefited all and harmed none. There will come a day when all nations will give up some sovereignty that they may have peace and enjoyment of moderate benefits. No one gave up much sovereignty under the Covenant.

We shall have various choices when the arms of the United Nations are crowned with victory. We can (1) do what we did after the last war, sulk in our tent, drift into isolation; (2) enter a military alliance similar to the Axis. Both of these choices would lead to war. (3) We could accept Clarence Streit's *Union Now*, an immediate federation of all democratic powers, which is unlikely. Nations are not yet at the point where they will so dilute their sovereignty. (4) We could revive the League. (5) We can erect an Executive Council of the United Nations which can take the most effective parts of the League and employ them.

We should not attempt too little nor too much. An Executive Council of the United Nations should do a few things well and with iron resolution. Weakness, vacillation or divided counsels will lead us to another war. Whereas the staffs of the chief military powers engaged on our side, Russia, China, the British Commonwealth and the United States, must be primarily charged with fighting the war, the Executive Council should be primarily charged with stating the aims of both the war and the peace, in framing and announcing *before the guns cease firing*,

both the immediate and the long-term measures which will be taken to make and to keep the peace. A few resolute steps, with no fanfare, steps we are ready to pledge ourselves to, now, will test out whether association together can lead us to a more elaborate and enduring structure which may include all mankind.

Not a moment should be lost giving effect to pre-announced plans when the war ends, plans to *occupy*, to *help feed*, if necessary, to *administer*, to *protect*, and to *re-educate* the Axis. No armistice and no peace conference is needed. Either would imperil the quick working of the material and spiritual forces of recovery. The Axis nations will be physically and spiritually bankrupt. Their peoples will respond to any clear-cut measures, definitely dated in extent of operation. They will respond to plans carried through with iron resolution. There must be no hesitation, no waste of time. Each Axis nation should be handled by only one Allied power as trust-

tee for all the rest. Unless prearranged, clear-cut action is taken the moment the war ceases, the great moment will be lost, and we shall be compelled to fight another war.

In major tests the League failed. This was no fault of the tool which was made to bear only certain strains. The faults of the Covenant were few; given wholehearted cooperation by the United States, it probably would have worked well. The great dereliction was in the behavior of individuals and of nations. Some day enlightened minds—after this war or the next, or the next—will build an instrument which will command respect and loyalty and be powerful enough to save mankind from the international immorality in which we flounder today. If we do not, through an Executive Council of the United Nations or by some other method, form an even more adequate device than the League, and if by chance we refrain from joining again, a third World War is inevitable.

The World Church: News and Notes

"We Shall Hate or We Shall Fail"

A group of leaders in the Christian Student Movement in answer to Rex Stout's recent article entitled "We Shall Hate or We Shall Fail" make the following statement. The statement declares in part:

"It is impossible for us to accept the position that our attitude must be merely one of 'deep and implacable resentment,' of 'loathing' and of 'contempt.' This we would say is to stoop to the level of the persons who are committing these acts of inhumanity against their fellow man. This is to lay the ground for a revengeful peace, resulting only in the travesty of another war.

"To understand the economic, cultural, political and religious history of post-war Germany is to understand what constituted the seedbed of German Fascism with its eventual alignment between powerful financial and industrial monopoly and the frenzied, despairing men and women cast up by the post-war inflation, unemployment and depression. Hitler gave to these people something to live for, something with which to bolster their falling ego—the Nazi quackery of the "master race." True, they have committed dastardly sins against their brothers, but it is for us to recognize that these acts have been committed by persons socially ill. If a man runs berserk about a community, he may be killed in the effort to bring him within the necessary controls which have been imposed by society for its own protection. But if he is killed it is not because he is hated, but because he must be stopped in his mad career for the sake of the welfare of the community involved.

"No more is it necessary that we hate the German people in order to bring to a stop the onslaught of violence and degradation which is following in the Nazi train. Theirs is a crime against civilization. This destructive flow of perverted energy must first be broken, and, at the present stage of civilized development our political structure allows of no other way for the accomplishment of this and except by the use of military

power and force of arms. But we utilize the armed power at our command at this time, not because we hate, but because this unleashed and destructive social force must be halted and brought within the bounds of civilized control in order that the constructive forces *within* the country may come to power and create a social order which will be for the good of all the people. We must have a vision of the new community for the achievement of which we act in the present. Hating is negative. Only a positive, dynamic, constructive approach to the future will bring us the world we seek. This is the dynamic which will carry us through this war to victory and to the creating of the peace beyond victory. Merely to hate is to be blinded by the whirl and flux of the immediate scene.

"One other comment should be added with regard to Mr. Stout's argument. There is no recognition whatsoever in his article of the international character of Fascism and the fact that there do exist similar destructive forces even in the democracies. . . ."

Reports on Churches and the Persecution of the Jews

Reports from Switzerland reaching the Office of War Information disclosed measures that churches in France, Switzerland and Slovakia are taking to halt persecution of the Jews.

According to these Swiss sources, refugees arriving in Switzerland from France report that churches of all faiths are continuing to help the Jews threatened by deportation. Large numbers of Jews are being hidden and fed by church groups.

The same sources reported that the most recent edition of an "illegal Christian magazine of wide circulation" in France contains the full text of all declarations made by church leaders against the persecution of Jews. The foreword of this publication states:

"Nazi culture is fundamentally anti-Christian. We

Christianity and Crisis

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want to demonstrate that on the plane of the spirit our duty is to resist and organize resistance to Nazism. The more Nazism makes its domination felt in France, the more clear and firm spiritual resistance must become."

Swiss church leaders have published a letter to the Jewish community declaring their deep sympathy with the suffering Jewish people, the report added.

Nazi Violence Mounts in Church Conflict

A message from the Temporary Church Leadership was read from practically all pulpits in Norway January 17th to warn pastors and congregations that Quisling authorities have enlisted the aid of police and are "adding violence to injustice" in imposing their will upon the Church of Norway.

Those parts of the message which have been received in this country declare:

"We thank God who thus far has helped us. We are also thankful for the spiritual power He has given the Church, and we thank Him for the courage in faith itself when the outlook was the darkest. The difficulties we have had, have directed us to the best. We greet the clergy of the Norwegian Church and all Christian brethren who have made personal sacrifices. We enter the New Year with hope and courage, but our Church is still embattled and faced with great difficulties.

"The present leaders of the State, through repeated encroachments on the Church's rights, have obliged the Bishops and clergymen to resign and to break with the Quisling State and clerical leaders. But the State leaders are constantly trying to get the Church into their power, and for that purpose they use force. They have shown their attitude towards the Church by adding violence to injustice.

"In all, thirty-five clergymen have been prevented from following the calling which God and this Church have given them. Our attempts to replace banished clergymen with other clergymen possessing the confi-

dence of the congregations are countered by further banishments and other encroachments on our rights. Entire congregations are left without pastors. In some cases the State has appointed new men, but under no circumstances can these be considered as real clergymen. They are often not only without the necessary theological education, but they are not trusted by the congregations. With the aid of police they have been forced upon congregations, and it has happened that, again with the help of police, they have forcibly conducted funeral services against the express wishes of relatives of the deceased."

The Nazi authorities have countered this statement by the church with the confiscation of the property of four of the leaders whom it regarded as responsible for the statement.

Extermination of the Jews

Of all the evils in occupied Europe, the Polish situation is still undoubtedly the worst. Hitler's obvious order that the Jews be exterminated, of which the American State Department has official knowledge, is in the process of being carried out. The Jewish population of Warsaw for instance has been reduced from 500,000 to 50,000 between late 1941 and late 1942. Lublin has been completely cleared of Jews. As many as 2,800 have been massacred there in one night. A Nazi correspondent reports that the vacated apartments were immediately made ready for Germans. He writes: "As soon as Lublin was purged of the Jews the German city authorities inspected the vacated apartments. . . . The task of cleaning the ghetto was entrusted to the police. . . . The cleaning brigade was followed by carpenters and glaziers." Cracow has been "purified" of Jews by a mass deportation of 17,000. Nothing in the history of Europe probably equals the mass misery which the German policy toward the Jews has created.

The Poles do not fare very much better than the Jews. The Nazi terror against the Polish church is particularly severe. Seven bishops and 90 per cent of the clergy have been exiled, killed or imprisoned, a total of 2,700. In one archdiocese only 34 priests are left to serve two million people.

This is our last opportunity to remind our subscribers whose subscriptions fall due in February that they still may secure a fourteen instead of twelve months subscription for the price of the renewal, which is \$1.50, by renewing their subscriptions before the end of the month.

We should, also, like to call upon our subscribers to send us the names of friends to whom we could send promotional literature for the purpose of soliciting their subscriptions.

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